Fifth Circuit Finds Seaman Shared Fault for His Injury While Following General Orders
In Andrew Lee Knight v. Kirby Offshore Marine Pacific, LLC, the 5th Circuit recently held that a Jones Act seaman can be contributorily negligent when following a supervisor’s general orders.
The plaintiff in the case, seaman Andrew Knight, brought a Jones Act claim against his employer, Kirby Offshore Marine Pacific LLC, for an ankle injury sustained when he stepped on a chafed line that he placed near him, while he was installing a new one.
The district court held that Kirby was negligent because the captain ordered Knight to change the chafed line during bad weather conditions, which was unsafe. The court also held Knight contributorily negligent by 50% because he failed to watch his footing while changing the chafed line and placed the chafed line at a location where he stepped on it. The district court also awarded, inter alia, $60,000 for Knight’s general damages for pain and suffering.
Knight appealed and contended that the district court erred as matter of law that he was contributorily negligent because he was following an order at the time of his injury, and in awarding him only $60,000 in general damages.
Knight relied on Williams v. Brasea, Inc. In this case, the Fifth Circuit stated that “a seaman may not be contributorily negligent for carrying out orders that result in his own injury, even if he recognized possible danger.” The majority rejected Knight’s argument. It found that the statement in Williams was dictum because it was unnecessary for deciding the issue before the court. As such, it was only persuasive precedent. The court analyzed Knight’s Jones Act negligence claim by distinguishing between general and specific orders—depending on whether the task that a seaman is ordered to do can be accomplished in more ways than one or not—and reiterated the principle that a seaman must perform his tasks with ordinary prudence under the circumstances. The majority held that the order given to Knight was a general order and therefore did not trigger the William’s dictum, which applied to specific orders.
The majority further upheld the district court’s finding that Knight was contributorily negligent because he failed to watch where he stepped, but remanded for the district court to reassess the percentage of Knight’s contributory negligence as to the placement of the chafed line on the deck.
Last, the majority affirmed the district court’s award of general damages, as not reversibly too low.
Judge Ho concurred with the majority opinion that Williams is not controlling in this case. Judge Elrod dissented on the basis that Williams applied because Knight was given an order, so he should not be contributorily negligent.
Please contact Magda Galitou Yiannopoulos or any other member of Phelps’ Marine and Energy team if you have questions or need compliance advice and guidance.
